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Abstract 
Honeypots are a defensive cyber security countermeasure used to gather data on intruder activities. By analysing 
the data collected by honeypots, mitigation strategies for cyberattacks launched against cyber-enabled 
infrastructures can be developed. In this paper, intelligence gathered from six Secure Shell (SSH) honeypots is 
presented. The paper is part of an ongoing investigation into analysing malicious activities captured by the 
honeypots. This paper focuses on the time of day attempted intrusions have occurred. The honeypot data has been 
gathered from 18th July 2012 until 13th January 2016; a period of 1,247 days. All six honeypots have the same 
hardware and software configurations, located on the same IPv4/24 subnet. Preliminary analysis of the data 
from all six hosts has been combined to show the number of attempted intrusions recorded by each honeypot and 
the top 20 countries attacking IP addresses have originated from. However, there is a variation in the number of 
attempted intrusions recorded on each of the six hosts. Findings from the research conducted suggest, there is a 
pattern of organised attempted intrusions from attacking IP addresses originating from China and Hong Kong 
during an 8am to 6pm working day. An additional investigation into the possible use of organised attacking 
workforces was conducted. 
Keywords:  Cybersecurity, SSH, Secure Shell, Honeypots 
INTRODUCTION 
Honeypots are decoy systems used to gather data on attempts made to gain unauthorised access to IT systems. 
There are three main types of honeypots that can be deployed. Firstly, a low-interaction honeypot is a system 
with minimal functionality and interaction with the actual honeypot. The configuration process is simple, with 
minimal maintenance required to sustain the honeypot. Secondly, a high-interaction honeypot. This system 
emulates a fully functional ‘real’ system; with an extensive configuration process. Due to the configuration of 
the system the maintenance and interaction required is demanding (Zemene & Avadhani, 2015). The final type 
of honeypot is a medium-interaction honeypot; it emulates some functionalities of a ‘real’ system. The 
configuration process is simpler than a high-interaction honeypot but the maintenance required is more 
demanding than a low-interaction honeypot (Zemene & Avadhani, 2015). An example of a medium-interaction 
honeypot is a Secure Shell (SSH) honeypot named Kippo (Desaster, 2013). 
Kippo SSH is an application specific honeypot that imitates some functions that are exhibited by a ‘real’ SSH 
system to the attacker. SSH is designed to securely transmit data using a point to point encrypted tunnel. Kippo 
honeypots are designed to collect various data from attacks propagated against the SSH service (Rabadia & 
Valli, 2014). An open-source, python 2.7 based event-driven program called Twisted libraries 
(TwistedMatrixLabs, 2013) is deployed by the Kippo honeypot to imitate and project a legitimate SSH session to 
the attacker. Data for this study has been acquired from identically configured Kippo SSH honeypots, using 
Ubuntu 11 Long Term Support (LTS) servers as their base operating system. All the honeypots were located on 
inexpensive Virtual Private Servers (VPS) The six honeypots are referred to as: Bobtail, Bronx, Dugite, Goanna, 
Magpie and Mopoke. Three of the honeypots were based in the United States (Bobtail, Magpie and Mopoke) 
with the other three located in the Netherlands (Bronx, Dugite and Goanna.) 
Preliminary analysis was conducted on the combined data from all six honeypots: the number of attempted 
intrusions recorded by each honeypot and the top 20 countries attacking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses have 
originated from. The focus of this research was on the time of day (24-hours) attempted intrusions had occurred. 
This paper is part of an ongoing investigation into data collected from Kippo SSH honeypots, with work 
conducted over the past five years 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 (Rabadia & Valli, 2014; Valli, 2012; Valli, 
Rabadia, & Woodward, 2013, 2015). An attempted intrusion is an unauthorised attempt to gain access or control 
of a honeypot.  
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Figure 1 - MySQL database structure for Kippo honeypot, adapted from  Valli, (2012) 
Overview of the Honeypot setup 
Kippo honeypots are designed to collect data from attacker interaction with the emulated SSH service. The 
emulated SSH service is provided by an open-source, Python based event-driven program called Twisted 
(BruteforceLabs, 2011; TwistedMatrixLabs, 2013). Twisted provides the libraries that are utilised and deployed 
by Kippo honeypot to imitate a valid “encrypted” SSH session to an entity (BruteforceLabs, 2011). The Kippo 
honeypot also emulates a fake file system to present to the attacker, along with, false system reporting Kippo 
allows interaction with artefacts such as /proc/cpuinfo or .bash_history log file. The level of deception in the 
default setting is limited however, this functionality however, is able to be expanded and modified at will. For 
this experiment key elements were modified such as /proc entries and different bash file entries to deceive 
attackers. 
The Kippo SSH honeypots are written in Python with a simple installation process. Source code was obtained 
from the kippo.googlecode.com Wiki (Code.google.com, 2012). The setup for these particular systems used in 
the data collection was conducted as specified by the BruteForce Lab Guide (BruteforceLabs, 2011). This 
deviates from the original Kippo SSH documentation and uses the authbind daemon instead of twistd as the 
initial connecting daemon for the service. The configuration lets authbind handle the binding of the twistd as a 
non-root user to a low numbered TCP port and passes this to the Kippo daemon. This configuration has been 
found to be more consistent, reliable and secure during the conduct of the research project. 
During the installation process a local MySQL database was configured securely to record all the interactions 
with the Kippo honeypots. Figure 1, reproduced from Valli (2012), shows the MySQL database structure used in 
the Kippo honeypots to record all the interactions.  
After recording to the local MySQL database, these data were then transmitted to a centralised PostgreSQL SQL 
server that was running a Debian-Linux operating system (Valli et al., 2013). Communication is achieved using 
a Python extension that uses a PostgreSQL driver to connect to the SURFIDS system IDS logging server (IDS, 
2013; SURFcertIDS, 2013). The centralised logging server utilises the SURFIDS system for storing the data 
from the honeypots into an aggregated PostgreSQL database. The database has functions and tables specifically 
for the Kippo honeypots data. Since 2013 however, Elasticsearch has also been used to consume data from the 
honeypots in addition to recording with SQL.  
In addition, on the honeypots that run Kippo the researchers also operate Dionaea (TheHoneynetProject, 2011) 
and Glastopf (MushMushFoundation, 2011) which also report to the database instances, however these data are 
not used in this analysis for this research.  
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
Analysis conducted on the total number of attempted intrusions on each of the six honeypots and the top 20 
countries attacking IP addresses have originated from is presented. An attempted intrusion is an unauthorised 
attempt to gain access or control of a honeypot.  The data used in this study was collated from the sessions tables 
of the honeypot dataset, shown in Figure 1. The data used in this investigation has been collected from 18th July 
2012 until 13th January 2016; this is a period of 1,247 days. Table 1 shows the number of attempted intrusions 
and the geolocations of the honeypots. A total of 5,554,680 attempted intrusions have been recorded, with the 
host known as Mopoke recording the most at 1,399,203 attacks. Host Goanna has received the least number of 
attacks at 520,250 as shown in Table 1. 
 
Honeypot 
Attempted 
Intrusions Geolocation 
Bobtail  934,966 United States 
Bronx  1,319,381 Netherlands 
Dugite  1,064,723 Netherlands 
Goanna  520,250 Netherlands 
Magpie  316,157 United States 
Mopoke  1,399,203 United States 
Total  5,554,680  
 
Table 1: Number of attempted intrusions and the geolocation of the honeypots. 
Using the combined data from all six honeypots, the country of each attacking IP address session had been 
compiled using IP to ANS Mapping (TeamCymru, 2016) an open-source application that uses netcat. The top 20 
countries attacking origin IPs was compiled and represented in Table 2. From 5,554,680 total attempted 
intrusions recorded; 31,596 unique attacking IP addresses have been identified attempting to gain unauthorized 
access to the six honeypots. Each host records the geolocation of the connections origin; however, this may not 
indicate the actual origin of the intruder attacking the hosts if the attacker is using a proxy. Data gathered from 
all six honeypots show ~64.47% of the recorded attacks originate from Chinese IP addresses followed by 
Romanian, Hong Kong, United States and France respectively as represented in Table 2. 
 
 Countries Attempted 
Intrusions  
1 China 3,581,114 
2 Romania 708,793 
3 Hong Kong 427,209 
4 United States 360,606 
5 France 99,161 
6 South Korea 90,983 
7 Germany 34,253 
8 Taiwan 19,906 
9 Brazil 19,260 
10 Ukraine 19,113 
11 Russia 18,644 
12 India 14,930 
13 Indonesia 14,925 
14 Czech Republic 13,999 
15 Turkey 13,904 
16 Japan 12,488 
17 United Kingdom 12,066 
18 Mexico 11,897 
19 Canada 10,975 
20 Italy  8,961 
Table 2: Top 20 originating countries of attacking IP addresses 
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INTELLIGENCE GATHERED 
In this section, the time of day attempted intrusions occurred for each of the six honeypots is investigated, and 
the combined dataset is presented. RStudio Version 1.0.136 (RStudio, 2016) was used to examine the honeypot 
datasets. The start time of the attacking IP sessions was used as opposed to the end time, as the research 
investigates the number of attempted intrusions occurring during a 24-hour day. Next, the date part of the 
timestamps was stripped, leaving only the time segment. Each time segment was rounded to the nearest 15-
minute interval. As hourly analysis would result in 24 data points and analysis conducted using 15 minute 
intervals resulted in 96 data points utilised. Allowing for a substantial data trend to be analysed, furthermore a 
reduced time interval could result in the data trend being hidden. The frequency of each 15-minute interval was 
compiled and depicted in Figure 2 to Figure 7. Once individual graphs for all six honeypots had been generated. 
The data from all six honeypots were combined and a graph was generated as shown in Figure 8.  
Records of the interaction for each honeypot were stored in a combined MySQL database, the structure of which 
is shown in Figure 1. As the nature of the research requires an analysis of the timestamps; maintaining the 
timestamp throughout the data collection and data analysis phases of the research was essential for the purpose 
of validity. To ensure the integrity of the timestamp data recorded on all six hosts are consistent, the Network 
Time Protocol (NTP) is used to sync all six hosts to GMT +8 time.   
Attempted Intrusion Detected on the Honeypots  
Figure 2 shows the time of day (24-hours format) using GMT+8 time as datum, for attempted intrusions that had 
occurred for the host known as Bobtail located in the United States. The highest recorded number of hits is at 
04:15 with 11,495 attempted intrusions and the lowest number of hits recorded is at 14:45 with 45 with 9,122 
hits. There is a significant decline in the number of attempted intrusions occurring after 12:00 until 00:15, with 
hits under 9,500. Whereas between 00:15 to 11:45 the number of intrusion attempts are above 10,000. This steep 
decline is clearly shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Time of day (24-hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Bobtail. 
Unlike Bobtail, the host known as Bronx shown in Figure 3, does not have a steep decline in the number of 
attempted intrusions recorded. Instead Bronx has a steady decline in the number of attempted intrusions 
throughout the day (24-hours). The highest recorded number of attempted intrusions is at 8:00 with 14,752 
recorded and the lowest recorded at 21:45 with 12,899 hits. There is a steady decline in the number of hits 
recorded after 08:00 until 22:00, where the number attempted intrusions steadily increase again. 
 
Figure 3: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Bronx. 
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Similar to Bobtail (Figure 2), Dugite has a steep decline (Figure 4) in the number of attempted intrusions. The 
highest recorded attack is 12,222 at 7:30 and 14:00. With the lowest recorded hit at 17:00 with 10,186 attempted 
intrusions recorded. The steep decline in the number of attempted intrusions were recorded between 14:30 and 
00:00, with around 10,500 and below. Whereas between 00:15 and 14:30 the number of hits were above 11,000. 
This is similar to the findings in from Bobtail. 
 
 
Figure 4: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Dugite. 
The host known as Goanna shown in Figure 5 has a steep decline in the number attempted intrusions similar to 
Figure 2 and Figure 4. The decline in the number of attempted intrusions starts 11:15 and continuous until 00:00. 
The number of attempted intrusions during this time are under 3,000. Most attempts occur between 00:15 and 
11:00 with over 3,600 recorded attempts.  The highest recorded number of attempted intrusions is 4,050 at 
02:00, and the lowest number recorded is 2,718 at 17:15.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Time of day (24-hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for honeypot known as Goanna. 
Figure 6 is from the Magpie host, it is similar to Bobtail, Dugite and Goanna as there is a steep decline in the 
number of attempted intrusions recorded. However, the number of attempted intrusions is mostly consistent 
throughout the day at around 5,500. There is a short decline from 20:45 until 23:45 with 4,700 recorded. The 
highest recorded attempted intrusions are at 8:45 with 6,371 hits recorded and the lowest at 23:00 with 4,529 hits 
recorded.  
 
Figure 6: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Magpie. 
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Host Mopoke shown in Figure 7, has the highest recorded number of attempted intrusions with 15,625 at 07:00, 
and the lowest number of hits recorded with 13,714 at 21:45. Mopoke, has similarities to Magpie, as there is a 
steep decline in attempted intrusions for a short time period compared to the other honeypots. The decline in the 
number of attempted intrusions recorded is from 19:30 until 00:00, with majority of the hits recorded below 
14,000. While between 00:15 and 19:15 the number of hits are recorded above 14,500, showing Mopoke and 
Magpie had similar trends in the number of attempted intrusions.  
 
Figure 7: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for Mopoke. 
Figure 8 is the combined data from all six honeypots; the mean line shows there is a steady decline in the 
number of attempted intrusions recorded. Whereas, the individual hosts aside from Bronx had a clear decline in 
the number of attempted intrusions recorded throughout the day (24-hours). The highest recorded number is at 
8:00 with 60,219 and the lowest at 14:00 with 56,188 recorded. The mean line illustrates the number of 
attempted intrusions recorded increase during the hours between 00:15 and 09:00 and thereafter decreased. 
Summary 
Findings from the data above suggest the number of attempted intrusions fluctuates as the day progresses. With 
Bobtail, Dugite and Goanna having similarities in a steep decline in the number of attacks from use times only. 
Whereas, Magpie and Mopoke only had a steep decline in the number of hits for a short period of time. Bronx 
and the mean from combined dataset show a steady decline in the number of attempted intrusions throughout the 
day.  
Table 3 summaries the findings from all six honeypots including the combined dataset. As shown in Table 3, all 
means between 00:00-11:59 are higher than the means between 12:00-23:59 and the mean hits for a day. 
Additionally, all the peak numbers have occurred early in the timeline, while the minimum numbers have 
occurred later in the timeline. 
 
Figure 8: Time of day (24 hours) attempted intrusions occurred, for the combined hosts. 
  
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Digital Forensics Conference 31
Table 3: Summary of the findings 
Honeypot  Geolocation Mean hits 
for a day 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
11:59 
Mean 
between   
12:00-
23:59   
Peak 
Time 
Peak 
Hits 
Minimum 
Time 
Minimum 
Hits 
Bobtail United States 9,780 10,287.29 9,272.71 04:15 11,495 14:45 9,122 
Bronx Netherlands 13,756.18 14,145.42 13,366.94 08:00 14,752 21:45 12,899 
Dugite Netherlands 11,115.53 11,547.75 10,683.31 07:30 12,222 17:00 10,186 
Goanna Netherlands 3,295.292 3,768.25 2,822.33 02:00 4,050 17:15 2,718 
Magpie United States 5,435.98 5,563.583 5,308.38 08:45 6,371 23:00 4,529 
Mopoke  United States 14,689.52 14,800.25 14,578.79 07:00 15,625 21:45 13,714 
Combined   58,072.5 58,407.23 57,737.77 08:00 60,219 14:00 56,188 
 
Table 4: Summary of honeypot datasets excluding attacking IP addresses from China and Hong Kong 
Honeypot  Geolocation Total 
number 
of hits 
Mean 
hits for a 
day 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
11:59 
Mean 
between   
12:00-
23:59   
Peak 
Time 
Peak 
Hits 
Minimum 
Time 
Minimum 
Hits 
Bobtail United 
States 
341,777 
 3,560.18 3,502.94 3,617.42 11:45 5,521 05:15 1,962 
Bronx Netherlands 343,386 3,576.94 3,689.42 3,464.46  02:00 5,347 06:00 2,172 
Dugite Netherlands 205,860 2,144.38 2,178.15 2,110.6 11:45 3,325 07:45 283 
Goanna Netherlands 15,402 160.44 166.73 154.15 08:45 845 09:45 0 
Magpie United 
States 
197,113 
2,053.26 1,729.4 2,377.13 20:00 3,917 12:45 240 
Mopoke  United 
States 
463,093 
4,823.89 4,535.54 5,143.76 12:00 8,120 07:15 2,812 
Combined   1,566,631 16,319.07 16,111.29 16,526.85 23:45 18,858 01:30 12,485 
 
Figure 9: Combined dataset of mean time of day attempted intrusions have occurred excluding attacking IP 
addresses originating from China and Hong Kong. 
DISCUSSION 
Preliminary analysis was conducted on the data collected from all six honeypots; the number of attempted 
intrusions recorded by each of the honeypots was presented. Mopoke recorded the most activity at 1,399,203. 
Among the top 20 countries where attacks originated (Table 2), IP address from China comprised about 65% of 
the attacks. 
The mean from the complete datasets for all the honeypots show the mean between 00:00-11:59 is higher than 
the mean between 12:00-23:59. From the findings it is suggested that the geolocation of the honeypots may not 
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determine when attempted intrusions are carried out, as Bobtail (United States), Dugite (Netherlands) and 
Goanna (Netherlands) showed similar activities. However, Magpie and Mopoke were both located in the United 
States and similar activities had been identified. This mean indicates the global or distributed nature of these 
observed attacks. 
The observation made from the data represented in the previous section suggest the number of attempted 
intrusion decrease as the day progresses. The honeypot datum is GMT+8 time. As shown in Table 2 attacking IP 
address originating from China and Hong Kong are first and third respectively. To verify whether there is a 
linkage between the decline in activity as the day progresses and attacking IP addresses originating from China 
and Hong Kong additional experiments had been conducted. IP addresses from China and Hong Kong had been 
removed from the individual honeypot datasets as well as the combined dataset.  
Table 4 represents data from the honeypot datasets with attacking IP addresses originating from China and Hong 
Kong excluded. The honeypots located in the United States and the combined dataset have a higher mean for the 
hours between 12:00-23:59 as opposed to the mean for the hours between 00:00-11:59 and the mean for the 
whole day, unlike Table 3. Whereas, the honeypots located in the Netherlands have a higher mean for the hours 
between 00:00-11:59. The peaks   are spread over the day, Table 3 shows peak occurring between 02:00-08:45, 
while Table 4 shows times between 02:00-20:00 and 02:00-23:45 when including the combined dataset. In Table 
3, all minimum hits have occurred between 12:00-23:59 but Table 4 shows all minimum hits have occurred 
between 00:00-11:59 aside from Magpie with the minimum number of hits occurring at 12:45, suggesting the 
use of organised attacks. 
 
Table 5: Summary of honeypot datasets from attacking IP addresses from China 
Honeypot  Geolocation 
Mean 
hits for a 
day 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
07:59 & 
17:00-
23:59 
Mean 
between   
08:00-
16:59 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
08:29 & 
17:30-
23:59 
Mean 
between 
08:30-
17:29 
Mean 
between   
00:00-
08:59 & 
18:00-
23:59 
Mean 
between   
09:00-
17:59   
Mean 
between   
00:00-
07:59 & 
18:00-
23:59 
Mean 
between   
08:00-
17:59 
 
Bobtail 
United 
States 
5,731.99 5,819.28 5,586.5 5,882.92 5,480.44 5,898.52 5,454.44 5,879.93 5,524.88 
Bronx Netherlands 9,225.43 8,900.83 9,766.42 8,905.15 9,759.22 8,896.6 9,773.47 8,853.48 9,746.15 
Dugite Netherlands 7,733.6 7,745.08 7,714.44 7,823.62 7,583.56 7,880.12 7,489.39 7,831.86 7,596.03 
Goanna Netherlands 3,295.29 3,346.82 3,209.42 3,381.3 3,151.94 3,419.5 3,088.28 3,387.77 3,165.83 
Magpie 
United 
States 
2,339.97 2,205.67 2,563.81 2,242.12 2,503.06 2,253.97 2,483.31 2,214.82 2,515.18 
Mopoke  
United 
States 
9,137.96 9,239.28  8,969.08  9,243.05  8,962.81  9,236.08  8,974.42  9,241.25 8,993.35 
Combined   37,303.27  37,256.13  37,381.83  37,243.62  37,402.69  37,235.85  37,415.64  36961.95 37781.13 
 
 
The trends observed with the datasets including the attacking IP addresses from China and Hong Kong are not 
present when excluding these attacking IP addresses. Figure 9, depicts the mean for time of day and the number 
of attempted intrusions made for the combined dataset excluding attacking IP addresses originating from China 
and Hong Kong. Unlike figure 8, figure 9 does not have a distinct trend of a steady decline as the day progresses. 
There are many clear peaks and troughs throughout the day in figure 9 as opposed to figure 8. The trend of the 
number of attempted intrusions made decreases as the day progresses is present in the datasets including the 
Chinese and Hong Kong attacking IP addresses however it is not depicted in the datasets with these attacking IP 
addresses excluded. 
Further investigation into the suggestion of organised attacker workforces being deployed by countries such as 
China has been conducted. The mean of the number of attempted intrusions occurring during the “average 
working day” ranging of hours between 08:00-17:59 were compared to the mean for the hours outside this range. 
By comparing the means of the number of attempted intrusions occurring between the “average working day” 
08:00-17:59 and outside these specific hours of 00:00-07:59 then 18:00-23:59, it could be suggested organised 
attacks are being deployed within the working day. Table 5, shows the results from the analysis conducted. An 
“average working day” consisting of hours between 08:00-16:59, 08:30-17:29, 09:00-17:59 and 08:00-17:59. 
From the information shown in Table 5, only Bronx, Magpie and the combined dataset suggest presence of 
organised attacks being deployed. However, none of the means of the “average working day” for Bobtail, 
Dugite, Goanna and Mopoke are higher the means for the remainder of the day. Further investigation is needed 
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as Bronx and Magpie suggest the possible presence of organised attacks using workforce being deployed by 
countries such as China. 
CONCLUSION 
The focus of this research was analysing the time of day attempted intrusions have occurred, the datum for this 
was GMT +8 time. The findings from this research show, the complete datasets from all six honeypots have a 
decline in the number of attacks as the day progressed through GMT +8 time. Three trends had been identified: 
 A steep decline in the number of hits in the afternoon with the lower number of hits sustained between 
00:00-11:59 GMT +8 time.  
 A steep decline in the number of attacks, the decline in activity was for a shorter time period and much 
later in the day.  
 A steady decline throughout the day.  
Investigating further into the trends identified, all attacking IP addresses originating from China and Hong Kong 
were excluded. The observed trends in the complete dataset where not present in the dataset with the excluded 
attacking IP addresses. The honeypots located in the United States have a higher mean for the hours between 
12:00-23:59, whereas the honeypots located in the Netherland have a higher mean between 00:00-11:59. Unlike 
the complete datasets, all honeypots including the combined dataset had higher mean hits recorded between the 
hours of 00:00-11:59. Further investigation is needed to determine the significance of geolocation in the 
attempted honeypot intrusions. Upon the findings suggesting there is a linkage between time of day and 
attacking IP addresses originating from China and Hong Kong, additional investigation was conducted into the 
use of organised attacking work forces by countries such as China. The mean for the “average working day” was 
compared to the mean of hours outside the specify time. Analysing the results shown in Table 5, Bronx, Magpie 
and the combined dataset suggested the uses of organised attacking workforces being deployed as all four shifts 
had a high mean then the remainder on the day. However, the observation was not present in the remaining 
honeypots. Further research needs to be conducted as Bronx, Magpie and the combined dataset suggest the use 
of organised attacks during a working day by counties such as China.  
 
Future work 
In future work, further analysis will be conducted on the Kippo SSH honeypot datasets. The time of day attacks 
have occurred for each of the top attacking countries including China and Hong Kong will be investigated which 
could yield an explanation in the decline of attacks as the day progresses. Also, data on the attacking IP 
addresses will be explored further, to identify if a distinct pattern for attacking IP addresses originating in the 
same geographical location is present. Analysis will also be conducted into suggestions of organised attacks 
during “business hours” workforces being deployed. Further investigation is needed to determine the 
significance of geolocation in attempted honeypot intrusions, this can be achieved by deploying honeypots in 
different geographical locations. 
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